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THE DILEMMA OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION: BALANCING THE POWER OF
THE SUPRANATIONAL EU ENTITY
AGAINST THE SOVEREIGNTY OF ITS
INDEPENDENT MEMBER NATIONS
Barbara Crutchfield Georget
Paul L. Frantztt
Jutta Birmelettt
INTRODUCTION
The European Union (EU)1 has a legal and political struc-
ture unique in the world because it is composed of fifteen sover-
eign nations2 bound together by a series of treaties3 into a
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ature, College of Liberal Arts, California State University, Long Beach. The three
professors would like to acknowledge the help of Birte Phleger, Graduate Assis-
tant, who subsequently received her M.A. in History from California State Univer-
sity, Long Beach.
1 The term "European Union" has political significance, the exact scope of
which is not yet fully determined. The nationals of the Member States are now
citizens of the Union. See P.F.R.F. MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN UNION LAw
3-7 (6 ' ed. 1995). "European Union" has been used after implementation of the
Maastricht Treaty on November 1, 1993. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992,
Official Journal of the European Communities No. C 224/79 (official English text),
31 I.L.M. 247 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1993), commonly referred to as the Maas-
tricht Treaty [hereinafter Maastricht Treaty].
2 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom.
3 The first treaty was the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Com-
munity [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. The EEC Treaty, also commonly referred to as
the Treaty of Rome, has been amended several times including various acts of ac-
cession admitting new Member States to the EU; the Treaty Establishing a Single
Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities, Apr. 8, 1965 (en-
tered into force July 1, 1967), commonly referred to as the Merger Treaty [herein-
after Merger Treaty]; the Single European Act (SEA), Feb. 12, 1986 (entered into
force July 1, 1987) [hereinafter Single European Act]; and the Maastricht Treaty,
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supranational entity.4 The EU can establish itself as a formida-
ble global force,5 with its population of over 370 million people,6
if it is able to control the nationalistic and introspective mood of
its independent Member States. At issue is whether a United
States of Europe has a reasonable prospect of becoming a
reality.
The willingness to relinquish certain aspects of national
sovereignty to a supranational entity was a direct result of
World War II. 7 In the aftermath of this war, Europe had to look
to transnational and international cooperation as a solution to
the continued prospect of conflict.8 The initial development of a
structure, which would unify Europe, began in 1952 when six
supra note 1. See Trevor C. Hartley, Constitutional and Institutional Aspects of the
Maastricht Agreement, 42 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 213 (1993); Heinrich Kirschner, The
Framework of the European Union Under the Treaty of Maastricht, 13 J.L. & COM.
233 (1994).
4 The term supranational entity is aptly applied to the EU because of this
unique political structure. A supranational entity has the power to make decisions
that are binding on member states and citizens in those member states even if
those member states disagree. See BRUCE RusSE'rI & HARVEY STARR, WORLD POLI-
TICS: THE MENU FOR CHOICE 57 (1989).
5 The EU is already asserting itself as the sole authority in Europe to speak
for its Member States. For example, in March, 1996, leaders of the EU met in
Bangkok with leaders of various East Asian countries for a summit focusing on
economic cooperation. Dan Biers, Asian European Leaders Meet to Foster New Eco-
nomic Ties, ASIAN WALL ST. J. WKLY., Mar. 11, 1996, at 5. The EU also routinely
sends a representative to the annual economic summit of the Group of Seven (G7)
even though France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom are members in
their own right of the G7. See In the Management of EU Affairs, the Commission
has developed dynamic relations with the other institutions <http://europa.eu.int/
en/commnc9500/relation.html>.
6 The EU's combined population of over 370 million is especially significant
when compared with the United States (265 million) and Japan (125 million). THE
WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1997 741, 744, 758, 767, 769, 776, 786, 787,
794, 802, 810, 819, 821, 829, 831 (1996). Trade with the EU is very important to
the United States. See INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
U.S. FOREIGN TRADE HIGHLIGHTS 1995 (1996). The fifteen member EU annually
purchases more than 21% of total U.S. exports compared with only 11% for Japan.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. FOREIGN TRADE
HIGHLIGHTS 1995 17-18 (1996). By contrast, 17.7% of U.S. imports come from the
EU compared with about the same percentage (16.6%) from Japan. INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. FOREIGN TRADE HIGHLIGHTS
1995 21-22 (1996).
7 DEREK W. URWIN, THE COMMUNITY OF EUROPE: A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION SINCE 1945 7 (2d ed. 1995).
8 DAVID FREESTONE & J.S. DAVIDSON, THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEwoRK OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 2-3 (1988).
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol9/iss1/3
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countries 9 joined together as members of the European Coal
and Steel Community (ECSC). 10 The progress toward unity
was further achieved with creation of the European Atomic En-
ergy Community (Euratom)" and the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC)12 in 1958 by the same six countries. 13 Between
1958 and 1992 six new countries 14 were added to the three coex-
isting Communities. In 1986, the enlarged Communities fur-
thered the unification process with approval of the Single
European Act (SEA).' 5 In 1992, the pivotal Treaty on European
Union (Maastricht Treaty)16 was signed in which there was an
attempt to fully integrate the political, social, and economic in-
stitutions of the EU.' 7 In 1995, the EU expanded by three more
Member States' to its current membership of fifteen.' 9 An ad-
ditional twelve countries, many of them in the former Commu-
9 The original six Member States were Belgium, France, (West) Germany,
Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 606 (1992).
10 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY [herein-
after ECSC Treaty]. See RAY AUGUST, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 175 (1975).
11 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY [herein-
after EURATOM Treaty].
12 EEC Treaty, supra note 3.
13 For a list of the six countries, see supra note 9.
14 Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom in 1973; Greece in 1981; and Portu-
gal and Spain in 1986. EU BASICS: WHAT COUNTRIES ARE MEMBERS OF THE EU?
(Visited March 10, 1997) <http:/eubasics.allmansland.com/general.html#xtocid
266093>.
15 The Single European Act, supra note 3.
16 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 1.
17 The German Federal Constitutibnal Court stated in October, 1993 that "the
[Maastricht] Treaty establishes an association of states for creating an ever-closer
union among the peoples organized into states of Europe, not a state based upon a
'single' European nation." See 2 BVerfGE 2134/92 u.a., in EUROPAISCHE GRUN-
DRECHTE ZEITSCHRIFT [egz] 439 (1993); Kirschner, supra note 3.
18 The three member states are Austria, Finland and Sweden. EU BAsICS,
supra note 14.
19 Norway considered membership in the EU, but the voters of Norway re-
jected EU membership by a nation-wide vote in 1995. Hugh Carnegy, Norway
rules out EU entry, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1995. This was the second time that Nor-
way rejected EU membership, the first coming in 1972. Norway thriving one year
after rejecting EU membership, AGENCE-FRANCE-PRESSE, Nov. 28. 1995.
3
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nist Eastern Europe, are currently seeking EU membership. 20
Other countries are close to seeking EU membership. 21
This article discusses the struggle between the integration-
ists, who argue that there should be a more federal form of gov-
ernment, and the nationalists who seek to insulate their
countries from a supranational entity.22 This article also exam-
ines the historical background of the European Union and the
difficulties it encountered in its attempt to strike a balance be-
tween the sovereignty of its independent Member States and
the sovereignty of the supranational entity. The authors com-
pare the stages of development of the EU from 1952 to the pres-
ent with the development of two federal systems, Germany and
the United States. Germany is used as an example because of
its experience in unifying independent states under one federal
form of government, thus, making it an EU Member State,
based on its history, that would understand and, therefore,
most likely accept a united Europe. By contrast, the United
States is used as an example for the purpose of showing the
comparison between its 1774 to 1787 progression to a federal
form of government with the events of the EU from 1952 to the
present.
II. ISSUES OF FEDERALISM: INTEGRATIONISTS vs. NATIONALISTS
A. The Early Years
A federalist approach in the EU would mean the adoption
of a form of political organization 23 in which the exercise of
power is divided between the central government and Member
State governments, each having the use of those powers as a
20 The twelve countries are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hun-
gary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Romania and Turkey. THE Eu-
ROPEAN COMMISSION, EUROPEAN UNION, EuROCOM 3 (Feb. 1996).
21 For example, Slovenia is close to signing an association agreement with the
EU. John Reed, Slovenia Nears Pact to Initiate EU Membership, WALL ST. J., May
29, 1996, at A14.
22 RUSSETr & STARR, supra note 4.
23 The framers of the Treaty of Rome in the 1950s restricted the original Eu-
ropean Economic Community to economic activities. EEC TREATY, supra note 3.
By 1992, the Maastricht Treaty included language dealing with "common foreign
and security policy" and "a citizenship of the Union." Maastricht Treaty, supra
note 1, tit. I, art. B. These terms would have been unacceptable in the 1950s, but
in the 1990s, these terms show a willingness on the part of the Europeans to con-
sider greater integration in the EU.
[Vol. 9:111
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matter of right, and each acting on the same citizen body.24 It is
no easy task for proudly independent European nations to agree
to give up fundamental rights to form a more powerful central
government.25
The strongest historical support for unity emerged from the
Resistance movements of war-torn Europe in the 1940s. 26 The
Resistance fighters put aside their national and ideological con-
flicts to fight for a common objective.27 One ardent proponent of
a united Europe was the Italian Resistance fighter Altiero
Spinelli. 28 In a paper that was generated at a conference in Ge-
neva in July 1944, Mr. Spinelli argued "for a federal Europe
with a written constitution, a supranational government di-
rectly responsible to the people of Europe and not national gov-
ernments, along with an army under its control, with no other
military forces being permitted."29
When World War II was over, several developments caused
general support for a United States of Europe to diminish.
30
Exiled or imprisoned political leaders re-emerged in their re-
spective countries. 31 Ideological and traditional divisions be-
tween socialists, communists and conservatives came back to
the surface.32 These political disputes had been put aside dur-
ing the Resistance movement because of the common cause. 33
Following the end of World War II, there were many who
envisioned a unified Europe. 34 For them unity meant strength
and the path to world power.35 As early as 1946, Sir Winston
Churchill referred to the creation of "a kind of United States of
Europe."36 The Cold War made federalism, as viewed by the
24 See generally Paul J. Scudiere, "In Order to Form a More Perfect Union"
The United States, 1774-1791, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES: THE ROLE
OF THE ORIGINAL THIRTEEN IN THE FRAMING AND ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CON-
STITUTION 3 (Patrick T. Conley & John P. Kaminsky eds., 1988).
25 STARR & RUSSETT, supra note 4, at 416.
26 URWIN, supra note 7, at 7.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 8.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 10-11.
31 URWIN, supra note 7, at 10.
32 Id.
3 Id.
34 Id.
35 STARR & RUSSETT, supra note 4, at 415.
36 URWIN, supra note 7, at 29.
19971
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Resistance leaders, no longer possible. 37 Many commentators of
the 1960s and early 1970s were adamant in their insistence
that the EEC, one of the communities that would become what
is now the EU, was not a federation. 38 It was described in a
somewhat negative light as a "mistrustful, egotistical formula
which foresees failure in due course," as opposed to the federa-
tion which is favorably compared to a marriage in which part-
ners are committed "without limits of interest or of time."39
Writings on the subject during the 1960s generally deny that
the EEC incorporated any federal characteristics and found
that its field of competence was strictly limited to economic is-
sues.40 There were statements like: "[t]he Member States, re-
maining fully sovereign in the political field, have transferred
limited powers only in the field of economy, in order to achieve
specified objectives with well-defined means"41 and "[clontrary
to what would happen in a federal system, the institutions of
the Community have no general competence to take whatever
measures would prove necessary to reach the assigned objective
in the field of economy."42
B. The Necessity of a Constitution
There are academic arguments over the issue of the EU not
having a federalist direction because it does not have the neces-
sary prerequisite of a constitution. A series of treaties, such as
those governing the EU, have not been accepted as a formal
constitutional basis for a federation. 43 After the American
Revolution the concept of a constitution developed as an essen-
tial governmental instrument, one in which the fixed principles
37 STARR & RUSSETY, supra note 4, at 416.
38 THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 91 (Denis de Rougement ed., V. Ion-
escu trans., 1979) [hereinafter de Rougement].
39 Id.
40 Michael Gaudet, The Legal Framework of the Community, in LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY AND THE EUROPEAN FREE
TRADE ASSOCIATION 8, 9-10 (1961).
41 Id. at 9-10.
42 Id. at 10.
43 See Survey: European Union, THE ECONOMIST, May 31, 1997, at 18.
[Vol. 9:111
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of reason and the fixed objects of the public good are stated spe-
cifically in a formal basic document.44
In the Treaty of Rome,45 the Member States46 agreed to
"take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular,
to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of [the]
Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the
Community."47 In addition, they professed to "abstain from any
measures which could jeopardize the attainment of the objec-
tives of [the] Treaty."4- In other words, the Member States'
motivations in forming the union in the first place ensure gen-
eral acceptance of its institutions.49 As experts have pointed
out, possible open conflict can be resolved only by two options:
"either to bring [the Member States'] constitutions in accord
with the Treaty or to revoke the Treaty."50
Any ambiguity of the EU's legal and political order does not
automatically disqualify EU institutions. 51 However, the ex-
isting uncertainty could lead to a loss of authority or bring
about its eventual disintegration without the stabilizing influ-
ence of a constitution.52 By contrast, the weakness in an inter-
national organization such as the United Nations, which in the
absence of any constitutional framework depends on the good
will of the members, becomes obvious in view of the situation in
the former Yugoslavia.5 3 Although the UN has passed resolu-
tions and the governments of the various countries in the region
have at times committed themselves to compliance, the resolu-
tions cannot be enforced. 54
44 John Murrin, A Roof without Walls, The Dilemma of American National
Identity, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION, ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN
NATIONAL IDENTITY 333 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987).
45 EEC TREATY, supra note 3.
46 The provisions of the Treaty of Rome apply to each newly admitted Member
State. EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 227.
47 EEC TREATY, supra note 3, at. 5.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 CLARENCE J. MANN, THE FUNCTION OF JUDICIAL DECISION IN EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 36 (1972).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 For a discussion of the UN's nonbinding resolutions, see RAY AUGUST, PUB-
LIC INTERNATIONAL LAw. 162-63 (1995).
1997]
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In view of this legalistic and intellectual debate, many
scholars find that "the EU as a supranational organization does
not possess any qualities of a state."55 Furthermore, they con-
clude that the treaties of the EU do not coincide with the mean-
ing of the word "constitution" as used in the national sense.56
Therefore, the EU should be categorized as a fourth entity, not
a state, not a federation, not simply an international organiza-
tion, but an entity in its own right that takes on some of the
characteristics of the others.57
C. The Necessity of an Institutional Structure
The institutional structure necessary for the EU to function
as a supranational entity is already in place. The EU is gov-
erned by a quadripartite institutional system. 58 This system in-
cludes the Commission,5 9 the Council of Ministers,60 the
European Parliament,61 and the Court of Justice. 62 Although
this structure exists, the system does not fully operate as a true
federal government. 63 For example, the Presidency of the EU
Council rotates on a six-month basis among Member States. 64
The duties of the office of the Presidency include the important
function of setting agenda items for the EU to consider. Pursu-
55 ROLAND BIEBER & JURGEN SCHWARZE, VERFASSUNGSENTWICKLUNG IN DER
EUROPAEISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT 20 (1984). (Dass die Europaische Gemeinschaft als
supranationale Organisation keine staatsqualitat besitzt).
56 See Id. (Im nationalen Verfassungsrecht uberwiegend gebraulichen unter-
scheidung von Verfassung im formellen und materiellen sinne anknupfen).
57 The term supranational entity is aptly applied to the EU because of this
unique political structure. See supra note 4.
58 See EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 4; see also THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
IN THE NINETIES 5 (Jonathan Davidson, ed., 1992); LASOK & J.W. BRIDGE, LAW
AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 33-34 (5th ed., 1991); DAVID
FREESTONE & J.S. DAVIDSON, supra note 8, at 66.
59 EEC TREATY, supra note 3, pt. 5, tit. I, ch. 1, § 3.
60 See id., § 2.
61 See id., § 1.
62 See id., § 4.
63 FREESTONE & DAVIDSON, supra note 8, at 66.
64 FREESTONE & DAVIDSON, supra note 8, at 66. The holders of the EU Council
Presidency for the next few years are: 1996 second half: Ireland; 1997 first half:
Netherlands; 1997 second half: Luxembourg; 1998 first half: United Kingdom;
1998 second half: Austria; 1999 first half: Germany; 1999 second half: Finland;
2000 first half: Portugal; 2000 second half: France; 2001 first half: Sweden; 2001
second half: Belgium. THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EUROPEAN UNION, EuRocoM 3
(Nov. 1995).
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ant to provisions in the Maastricht Treaty, the holder of the
Presidency now has the obligation to represent the EU in mat-
ters of "foreign and security policy."65
1. The Commission
The Commission is the executive arm of the EU and is re-
sponsible for putting EU policy into effect. 66 It is often called
the "Guardian of the Treaty,"67 referring to the Commission's
responsibility to ensure proper implementation of the Treaty of
Rome.68 The members of the Commission, which must be na-
tionals of Member States, are obligated to exercise indepen-
dence in the performance of their duties.69 As such, the
members of the Commission "shall neither seek nor take in-
struction from any Government or from any other body."70 The
Commission's tasks include working closely with the Council
and Parliament in the legislative process. 71 Several ways exist
by which the institutions of the EU are able to change or influ-
ence the law in the Member States.72 Legislation in the EU
generally is issued in the form of regulations and directives.
73
Regulations are directly applicable in all Member States. 74 Di-
rectives are binding on Member States, but the choice of form
and method of implementation of the directive is left to each
Member State.75 Directives have been much more commonly
used because they are less intrusive. 76 The Commission gener-
65 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 1, art. J.5(1).
66 EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 155.
67 EMILY NOEL, WORKING TOGETHER THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY 15 (1991).
68 EEC TREATY, supra note 3.
69 EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 157 (2).
70 Id.
71 LASOK & BRIDGES, supra note 58, at 34.
72 DICK LEONARD, THE ECONOMIST POCKET GUIDE To THE EUROPEAN UNION 31
(1988).
73 EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 189.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Directives have been used in areas such as the Product Liability Directive
28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 210) 29 (1985) and the Machinery Directive, 28 O.J.
EUR. Comm. (No. L 183) (1989).
1997]
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ally has the responsibility for initiation of regulations and
directives. 77
2. The Council
The Council is the main policy-setting arm of the EU.7 8
The legislative role in the EU is performed by ministers repre-
senting the governments 79 of the Member States and conducts
its business with limited public access.80 The Council is obli-
gated to "ensure coordination of the general economic policies of
the Member States."81 In doing so, the Council must confer
with the Commission in implementation of rules set forth by the
Council.8 2 The Council generally acts on majority weighted vot-
ing where the larger Member States have their votes weighted
more heavily.8 3 When the prime ministers or other heads of
state and government meet, the Council is called the European
Council.8 4
3. The European Parliament
The European Parliament was initially formed as an ap-
pointed "advisory" body.8 5 The first time Parliament convened
as a directly elected body was 1979.86 Only in the Maastricht
Treaty8 7 was European Parliament given a substantial par-
ticipatory role in the legislative process.88 Specifically, in terms
of foreign and security policy, the Presidency of the Council is
77 For a discussion of the EU legislative process generally, see LEONARD, supra
note 72.
78 LEONARD, supra note 72.
79 EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 146.
80 It has been reported that the British newspaper, THE GUARDIAN (London),
has instituted legal action to annul Council decisions that denied one of its report-
ers access to minutes of debates and to reports submitted to the Council. See Pa-
per Challenges Secrecy at EU in Making Laws, INT'L HERALD TRiB., July 6, 1995, at
5.
81 EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 145.
82 Id.
83 EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 148(2).
84 For a discussion of the European Council, see LEONARD, supra note 72, at
38-39.
85 LASOK & BRIDGES, supra note 58, at 34.
86 FREESTONE & DAVIDSON, supra note 8, at 72.
87 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 1.
88 FREESTONE & DAVIDSON, supra note 8, at 71-73.
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now obligated to "consult" the European Parliament 9 and to
ensure the views of the European Parliament "are duly taken
into consideration." 90 Members of the European Parliament are
elected by a direct vote of the people.91 When seated, members
are seated by party affiliation 92 and not by country.
4. The Court of Justice -
The Court of Justice of the European Union, located in Lux-
embourg, functions as the primary judicial arm of the EU.93
The Court of Justice is charged with ensuring that the law is
observed in the interpretation and application of the Treaty of
Rome. 94 It is the EU's counterpart to the U.S. Supreme Court
from the standpoint that there is no appeal from its decisions. 95
The difference is that the U.S. Supreme Court is at the apex of a
structure of federal and state courts, while the European Court
of Justice has no hierarchical relationship to courts of the Mem-
ber States.96 A lower court was established by the Single Euro-
pean Act, called the Court of First Instance. 97 That court came
into operation in 1989 because of the increasingly heavy case
load of the Court of Justice.98
89 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 1, art. J.7.
90 Id.
91 EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 138(1).
92 There were eight parties represented in the European Parliament in Febru-
ary 1994. STATISTICAL OFFICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FACTS THROUGH
FIGURES 27 (1994). The two parties with the most representation were the Group
of the Party of European Socialists and the Group of European People's Party. Id.
93 In general, the types of cases that come before the European Court of Jus-
tice include: 1) disputes between Member States, 2) disputes between the EU and
Member States, 3) disputes between the EU entities, 4) disputes between individu-
als or corporate bodies and the EU, 5) opinions on international agreements and 6)
preliminary rulings on cases referred by national courts. See LEONARD, supra
note 73, at 47.
94 EEC TRATY, supra note 3, art. 164.
95 See Davidson, supra note 58, at 9.
96 The Court of Justice has jurisdiction only over European matters. Unlike
the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court of Justice can not hear cases involving matters
of purely national law. For a discussion of the Court of Justice, see Davidson,
supra note 58, at 9.
97 EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 168a.
98 The Court of Justice averaged 46 rulings yearly between 1953 and 1978.
From 1978 to 1991, it averaged 186 rulings a year and in each of the last three
years it has issued more than 200 judgments. Patrick Oster, Court of Justice Be-
comes Europe's 'Supreme Court,' NAT'L L. J., Oct. 24, 1994, at Al.
19971
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D. Present Status
Even though the intent of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty99
was to create a politically integrated Europe, events subsequent
to its effective date show opposition in some Member States. In-
herently the idea of integration carries with it notions of feder-
alism and a strong central government. Thus, the concept of an
integrated Europe raises the specter of loss of sovereignty and
arouses old fears and rivalries. For example, British conserva-
tives view European federal ideas as tantamount to disman-
tling their monarchy. They believe the sovereign nation-state is
the natural and proper unit of political life and that the EU
must limit itself to commercial concerns. On the other hand,
Germany and France have traditionally had more proponents of
greater European integration. Unfortunately for the integra-
tionists, their cause has suffered from the EU's inability to im-
plement a European policy capable of European-wide tasks
such as ending the war in Bosnia.100 In order to achieve a true
federal Europe, there must be a central institutional structure,
common defense and foreign policy, monetary union, and mas-
sive EU investment in a pan-European infrastructure.
Arguments raised at the EU's June 1995, Intergovernmen-
tal Conference in Cannes, France, made it clear that the Mem-
ber States are reluctant to give up their sovereignty and that
the ultimate creation of a federalist Europe may prove to be elu-
sive. One major ongoing issue is the establishment of a mone-
tary union.' 0 ' The leaders at the 1995 Intergovernmental
Conference conceded that they could not achieve a single cur-
rency in 1997 and established 1999 as the new deadline. 10 2 At
the EU's Summit held in Madrid in December 1995, it was de-
cided to set the inauguration for the European currency, named
euro, as a banking unit for January 1, 1999.103 Three and one-
half years later, on July 1, 2002, the euro will replace those na-
tional currencies which had qualified for the Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU) and the former national currencies will
99 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 1.
100 Europe's Changing Union, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 27, 1994, at 8.
101 Single-Currency Minded: European Union, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 23, 1995,
at 61.
102 Id.
103 Id.
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cease to be legal tender. 10 4 In order to qualify their currencies
for the EMU acceptance, Member States will have to meet strict
requirements that include low inflation rates, low debt levels
and two years of consistently stable exchange rates. 10 5 Ger-
many has indicated that it will be unable to meet the allowed
debt level.10 6
The intrusion of federalism into the EU structure is appar-
ent in provisions in the treaties which create the EU. 107 A sig-
nificant aspect of the Single European Act of 1986108 is that it
expanded the goals of the EU from the perspective of creating a
free internal market for goods, labor, services and capital' 0 9 to
achieving a truly unified Europe in economic and monetary pol-
icy, social policy, research and technology, and the environ-
ment.1 0 This Act renewed the commitment to transform
relations among the Member States into a European Union."'
One writer contends that although the EU shuns federal termi-
nology, the creation of a single market program essentially con-
verts the EU from a customs union into a quasi-federal body. 112
In legislative matters, the EU takes a distinctly federal ap-
proach through the principle of subsidiary, in which the EU is
granted jurisdiction for those policies that cannot be effectively
handled at the domestic level of government. 113 For example,
the Treaty of Rome 1 4 mandates that in "areas which do not fall
within [the EU's] exclusive competence, [the EU] shall take ac-
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Matt Marshall, Germany Won't Meet EU Debt Target, Imperiling Schedule
for Single Currency, WALL ST. J., June 13, 1996, at A10.
107 For a list of the treaties, see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
108 Single European Act, supra note 3.
109 The EEC TREATY speaks of free movement of goods (EEC TREATY, supra
note 3, pt. 3, tit. I) and free movement of persons, services and capital (EEC
TREATY, supra note 3, pt. 3, tit. III).
110 Davidson, supra note 58, at 11-12.
111 See id. at 12.
112 Donald C. Dowling, EC Employment Law After Maastricht: "Continental
Social Europe," 27 INT'L LAw. 1 (1993).
113 See generally George B. Hefferan, III & Joanne Katsantonis, Movement To-
wards an Internal Market in 1993: An Overview of Current Legal Developments in
the European Community, 3 Duxx J. COMP. & INV'L L. 4-5 (1992).
114 Compare this provision of the Treaty of Rome with the Tenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States which provides: "The powers not delegated
to the Untied States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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tion, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and
in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be suffi-
ciently achieved by the Member States and can therefore,.., be
better achieved by the [EU]."115
There are cultural obstacles to greater European integra-
tion which may prove to be even more of a challenge. 1 6
Europeans continue to define themselves almost exclusively in
terms of their own nationhood.1 17 There are eleven official lan-
guages among the Member States and as many types of curren-
cies as there are EU nations.""' Although the EU has a well
developed quadripartite,11 9 institutional system, 120 structure
alone does not invoke a sense of European patriotism. Even
though there is an EU anthem,1 21 an EU flag, and an EU pass-
port, these symbols fail to rally a united patriotic European
spirit. It has been noted that perhaps this attitude results from
the fact that there have been no crucial European defining mo-
ments which would serve to engage ordinary people; no wars or
charismatic heroes to inspire the kind of supranational patriot-
ism or loyalty that can bind diverse peoples together. 22 Even
efforts of the EU Education Ministries to develop a European
component in their various school systems, such as a common
European history text that promotes a common European heri-
tage, have had questionable results due to local resistance. 23
This resistance is complicated by the political dilemma of what
115 EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 3(b).
116 See Tyler Marshall, The United States of Europe, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 1996,
at Al.
117 See Tyler Marshall, Citizens Immune to Euro-Fever, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 24,
1995, at Al.
118 The eleven languages are English, French, German, Italian, Dutch, Danish,
Greek, Spanish, Portuguese, Swedish and Finish. Office for Official Publications of
the European Communities (1996). Each member nation has its own currency.
THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1997 741, 744, 759, 767, 769, 776, 786,
794, 802, 810, 819, 821, 829 (1996).
119 EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 4.
120 See generally LASOK & BRIDGE and FREESTONE & DAVIDSON, supra note 58.
121 LUDWIG VON BEETHOVEN, Ode to Joy. EUROPEAN UNION, EUROPEAN COM-
MISSION 23 (1994).
122 See Marshall, supra note 116.
123 A European history book was developed by an international team of histori-
ans for use in EU Member States. ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF EUROPE. A UNIQUE
PORTRAIT OF EUROPE'S COMMON HISTORY (Frederic Delouche ed., U.S. ed. 1992).
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constitutes common European history and whose perspective is
to be followed. 124
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE UNIFICATION
OF EUROPE
It is necessary to examine the political history of Europe in
order to understand the dilemma of the EU in dealing with in-
dependent member nations which must relinquish certain sov-
ereign powers to the supranational entity.125 This examination
reveals the difficulties encountered from as early as the Roman
Empire in setting aside traditional notions of sovereignty to al-
low for the formation of a united Europe.' 26
A. Political, Social, and Cultural History of the EU
Throughout history, there have been dictators who desired
one European nation. They were often motivated by their drive
for power, not by any noble intentions of bringing peace and
prosperity to the masses. The idea of a united western Europe
goes back to the Roman Empire. 27 One could also cite the Car-
olingian, Napoleon's Empire, or Hitler's Third Reich, as at-
tempts aimed at the forceful unification of Europe.' 28 These
empires were created through wars, ruled by despots and relied
on coercion for unity.129 Once the rulers lost strength, the em-
pires fell. 130
Europe was populated by different tribes that were unique
and not interested in uniting with other tribes. 13' Later re-
gional differences traditionally prevented Europe from becom-
124 Id.
125 MICHAEL BURGESS, FEDERALISM AND EUROPEAN UNION: POLITICAL IDEAS, IN-
FLUENCES, AND STRATEGIES IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 1972-1987 11 (1989).
126 Id. at 26.
127 See generally YANN LE BoHEc, THE IMPERIAL ROMAN ARMY 148-50 (1994).
128 6 THE CAMBRIDGE MEDIEVAL HISTORY IX (J.R. Tanner ed., 1964). See also
4 THE NEW CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY 308-09 (C.W. Crawley ed., 1965); 12
THE NEW CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY 799 (C.L. Mowat ed., 1968) [hereinafter
Mowat].
129 6 THE CAMBRIDGE MEDIEVAL HISTORY IX (J.R. Tanner ed., 1964).
130 History in general has shown that attempts at global domination always
ultimately fail: the Roman Empire, the Church under Charlegmagne and his suc-
cessors, Napoleon and Hitler are examples. See generally references cited supra
notes 127 and 128.
131 See LE BOHEC, supra note 127, at 148-49.
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ing a federation. 132 People within the region were, and still are,
proud of their heritage, language, culture and traditions.1 3 3 It
took two devastating World Wars for Europeans to understand
that a permanent peace and prosperity may best be accom-
plished in a voluntary and joint effort.134 After World War II,
the need for collective security and European reconciliation be-
gan to change the international system.1 35 Economic and polit-
ical necessity convinced European leaders that, in addition to
their immediate purpose, integration and cooperation also serve
to prevent war.136
B. Economic Circumstances and Organizational
Consequences
The widespread devastation as the result of World War II,
the separation of Europe by the Iron Curtain, and the subse-
quent threats posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War,
forced Western European leaders to seek cooperation on eco-
nomic and political issues. 3 7 Even before World War II, the
fragmentation of Europe had a negative impact on each nation's
foreign trade.138 The war itself disrupted all European foreign
trade causing capital to flow to other nations, most notably the
U.S. 39 In turn, the U.S. felt obligated to infuse funds into Eu-
rope through the Marshall Plan in order to foster European re-
construction. 40 The Organization for European Economic
Cooperation (OEEC)' 4 ' was established in 1947 to ensure eco-
nomic integration within Western Europe and to control distri-
bution of U.S. aid from the Marshall Plan.142 This task was
completed by 1950, but the OEEC continued in its role of en-
couraging economic and trade relationships between coun-
132 Id. at 149.
133 See BURGESS, supra note 125, at 15.
134 Id. at 26.
135 Id. at 27.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 26-27.
138 MOWAT, supra note 128, at 262-64.
139 Id. at 580-81.
140 DONALD A. BALL & WENDELL H. MCCULLOCH, JR., INTERNATIONAL BusiNEss
138 (1996).
141 The Treaty of Rome mandated close cooperation between the OEEC and the
EU. EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 231.
142 LEONARD, supra note 72, at 3.
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tries.143 Post-war Western European integration can be traced
to 1948 when three of the smallest European countries,
Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, formed the
Benelux Union' 44 out of a conviction that "their economic fu-
tures were inextricably intertwined." 45 Although the Benelux
Union eventually planned to merge into a full economic union,
it was merely a customs union in the beginning with reduced
tariffs between these three countries and common external tar-
iffs for the rest of the world.146
A third organization, the Western European Union (WEU),
was created in March 1948 with the Treaty of Brussels. 47 The
WEU consisted originally of the United Kingdom, France,
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. 48 It provides "for
collaboration in economic, social and cultural matters and for
the collective self-defense. " 149 This organization has been
largely superseded by the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), 150 an alliance of the U.S., Canada and
most western European nations providing military security to
member nations.' 15 France has called for a European defense
force and the WEU may well serve this function. 52 A common
military defense is one of the missing elements in forming a Eu-
ropean federation.
The Benelux Union, the OEEC and the WEU provided a
step in the direction of changing the way in which countries
deal with each other. In these organizations the true power re-
143 In 1961, the OEEC became the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) and "widened its membership to include all the advanced
industrial nations of the non-Communist world." LEONARD, supra note 72, at 3.
Today, the OECD has about 25 members including 15 EU Member States and the
United States. Hellenic Resources Network: CIT World Factbook 1995. App C.
<http://www.hri.org/docs/CLA/Appendc.html> (last visited Mar. 17, 1997).
144 The Treaty of Rome recognized the existence of regional unions among
Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands "to the extent that the objectives of
these regional unions are not attained by application" of the Treaty of Rome. EEC
TREATY, supra note 3, art. 232.
145 LEONARD, supra note 72, at 3.
146 BALL & MCCULLOCH, supra note 140, at 740.
147 LEONARD, supra note 72, at 3.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 LEONARD, supra note 72, at 4-5.
151 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, VOLUME 8 at 777 (15' Edition 1992).
152 FREESTONE & DAVIDSON, supra note 8, at 3.
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mains with the national governments. It appears, however,
that the WEU may eventually assume a different role if it be-
comes the military arm of the EU. 153 The creation of the orga-
nizations of the OEEC, WEU and the Benelux Union resulted in
national sovereignty being reduced. 154 Politicians came to real-
ize that every international organization was condemned to fail-
ure in times of crisis if it did not have an institutional
framework. 55 There was a need to have institutions that could
enforce compliance if international harmony was ever to become
a reality. Visionaries like Jean Monnet, Konrad Adenauer and
Paul-Henry Spaak understood the importance of developing a
supranational institutional structure with the potential for
growth.156
Although in May 1952, a treaty was signed providing for
the creation of a European Defense Community (EDC), 157 the
notion that a supranational institution would control its mem-
ber countries' militaries initially was rejected by many. The
French National Assembly outright refused to give up such a
substantial part of its sovereignty.'15 Circumstances have now
changed making a European defense unit more palatable to the
French and other Member States and, apparently, if there is to
be a designated defense arm it most likely would be the
WEU.' 59
C. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)
The first step toward unification was taken by French For-
eign Minister Robert Schuman 60 in May 1950. He proposed to
153 LEONARD, supra note 72, at 169.
154 LEONARD, supra note 72, at 3.
155 URWIN, supra note 7, at 83.
156 LEONARD, supra note 72, at 4-8.
157 Id. at 6.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 169.
160 Mr. Schuman stated:
The French Government proposes to put the whole of the Franco-German
coal and steel production under a joint High Authority, in an organization
which is open for the other European countries to enter .... It will change
the destiny of these regions which for so long have been used for making
weapons of war of which they have been most frequently the victims. The
solidarity between the two countries established by the joint production
will show that a war between France and Germany becomes not only un-
thinkable but materially impossible.
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pool European coal and steel industries, which at that time
were part of every country's war arsenal, under a common au-
thority within an organization open to a number of European
countries. The treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC)161 was signed in Paris on April 18, 1951, by
Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands. This treaty went into force in 1952.
The plan was obviously to establish something more than
merely a new political structure for Europe. Jean Monnet, who
became the first President of the High Authority of the ECSC,
commented that "prosperity and vital social development are
inconceivable unless the countries of Europe form a federation
or a European entity which in turn creates a common economic
union."162 The ECSC constituted the first step toward a Euro-
pean Federation and served as a practice institution which con-
tributed to "an atmosphere of mutual confidence among its
members" by forcing them to tackle problems together.163
D. The Formation of the European Economic Community
(EEC) in the Treaty of Rome - 1958
Negotiations toward further economic unity continued dur-
ing the decade of the 1950s. 164 Jean Monnet joined the Action
Committee for the United States of Europe (ACUSE) which in-
vestigated the feasibility of establishing a common market. 165
This committee produced a report that became the basis of the
Treaty of Rome, 166 creating the European Economic Commu-
nity (EEC), which was signed on March 25, 1957,167 and became
effective January 1, 1958.168 The objectives 169 of the EEC were
set forth in the treaty:
RUSSETT & STARR, supra note 22, at 414.
161 ECSC TREATY, supra note 7.
162 RUsSETr & STARR, supra note 4, at 414.
163 Id. at 56.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 EEC TREATY, supra note 3.
167 Id.
168 LASOK & BRIDGE, supra note 58, at 17. On the same day that the EEC was
created, March 25, 1957, a separate treaty was signed establishing the European
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The purpose was to pool the six countries'
resources in order to keep up with the advances in nuclear technology that the
U.S. and the Soviet Union were making. Id.
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The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common
market and an economic and monetary union and by implement-
ing the common policies or activities referred to in [this Treaty], to
promote throughout the Community a harmonious and balanced
development of economic activities, sustainable and non-inflation-
ary growth respecting the environment, a high degree of conver-
gence of economic performance, a high level of employment and of
social protection, the raising of the standard of hiving and quality
of life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among
Member States. 170
The Treaty of Rome 171 still serves as the fundamental docu-
ment outlining rights and responsibilities in the EU. 1
72
1. Political Power Aspects of the Treaty of Rome
No general consensus is apparent when it comes to the dis-
cussion of the political implications of the Treaty of Rome.
1 73
Some argue that the EEC was founded on "the idea that the
factual common interests and common institutions in the eco-
nomic sphere would bring about the political unity of...
Europeans." 174 Yet, Belgian Prime Minister Paul-Henry Spaak
remarked that "[t]hose who drew up the Treaty of Rome... did
not think of it as essentially economic; they thought of it as a
stage on the way to political union.1 75 This statement implies
that the negotiators of the treaty had agreed on eventually mov-
ing toward a European federation. In fact, the Common Market
created by the EEC represented the fusion of two movements
169 It is interesting to compare the EU's objectives, as set forth in the Treaty of
Rome, with the Preamble of the Constitution of the United States:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquillity, provide for the
common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings
of Liberty to ourselves and out Posterity, do ordain and establish this Con-
stitution for the United States of America.
U.S. CONST. Pmbl (spelling in original). The Preamble speaks in terms of provid-
ing for the common defense while the Treaty of Rome only speaks of economic
union. It was not until the Maastricht Treaty that common defense polices were
proclaimed as an objective of the EU.
170 EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 2.
171 EEC TREATY, supra note 3.
172 See European Union, supra note 44.
173 See EEC TREATY, supra note 3.
174 de Rougemont, supra note 38, at 19.
175 See URWIN, supra note 7, at 76 (ellipsis in original).
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towards unity; one economic, the other, political. The first pres-
ident of the Commission, Walter Hallstein, said "[we] are not
integrating economies, we are integrating politics. We are not
just sharing our furniture, we are jointly building a new and
bigger house."176 By 1957, it became obvious through the pre-
ceding attempts at economic agreements that informal coopera-
tion had to give way to integration. 177 As one author wrote: "[i]f
one wishes to go all the way in abolishing customs duties and
quotas, i.e., in the commercial aspects of economic cooperation,
one's action cannot be limited to customs duties and quotas
alone."178
The literature on the subject generally downplays the po-
tentially sweeping powers of the EEC institutions in regard to
limiting each Member State's national sovereignty. Most imply
that the failure or limitations of previous trade agreements led
EEC proponents to insist on a comprehensive treaty. Since the
Treaty of Rome could not possibly include all the necessary as-
pects of harmonization policy,1 79 the Member States had to
commit themselves to endow institutions, the Council, the Com-
mission, the Court of Justice and the European Parliament,
with effective power.' 80
2. Growth of the EEC
After the EEC came into existence in 1958, some countries,
which were not included, came to view the EEC as a key to eco-
nomic success despite the inherent challenge to their sovereign
powers. Turkey' 8 ' and Greece'8 2 immediately applied for asso-
ciate membership.' 8 3 Other countries saw the value of eco-
176 Id.
177 Id. at 75.
178 Jean Deniau, The Objectives and Constitutional Structure of the European
Economic Community, in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMU-
NITY AND THE EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION 1, 4-5 (1961).
179 Harmonization is the process of requiring Member States to conform cer-
tain national laws to EU legislation in order to achieve uniform laws throughout
the EU.
180 EEC TREATY, supra note 3.
181 Turkey applied for full membership on April 14, 1987. Its application is
still pending. THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EUROPEAN UNION, EUROCOM 3 (Feb.
1996).
182 Greece became a full member effective in 1981.
183 LEONARD, supra note 72.
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nomic integration, yet wanted a structure preserving their
national sovereign powers.184 Norway, Sweden, Switzerland,
Denmark, Austria, Portugal and Great Britain formed the Eu-
ropean Free Trade Association (EFTA), which stressed coopera-
tion in matters of trade without the supranational
framework.185 Eventually, though, Great Britain and other
countries18 6 came to realize the value of the EEC and applied
for membership. They realized that economic ties among EFTA
member nations would never yield the kind of advantages that
EEC membership promised.18 7
E. Euratom
On the same day the Treaty of Rome 88 creating the EEC
was signed, a second Treaty of Rome creating the European
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom)18 9 was also signed by the
same six nations. 90 Euratom's purpose was to integrate the
fledging atomic energy industries of the six nations. As the
years immediately following Euratom's creation showed, how-
ever, each nation sought to develop its own atomic energy in-
dustry independent of the others. As a result, Euratom was
never able fully to accomplish its mission.' 91
Euratom's problems underscored the futility of a sector-by-
sector integration of Europe's economies.192 If integration were
to occur, it would have to be on a scale that could control the
entire economy. This is true in all industries, but it is especially
true in industries as politically sensitive as the atomic energy
industry. 19 3
184 Id. at 10.
185 Id.
186 Austria, Denmark, Portugal, and Sweden eventually also joined the EU.
Norway and Switzerland both rejected EU membership.
187 It was not until 1973, after many years of negotiations that the United
Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark were admitted to the EEC. LEONARD, supra note
72, at 13.
188 EEC TREATY, supra note 3.
189 EURATOM, supra note 11.
190 URWIN, supra note 7, at 75.
191 See id. at 75-77.
192 See id. at 77.
193 See generally id. at 77 (discussing political problems caused by Euratom).
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F. Consolidation of the Councils and Commissions of the
Communities
By the mid-1960s, it became apparent that in order to pro-
gress on integration, it would be necessary to combine the policy
making authorities from the three existing communities,
ECSC,194 EEC 195 and Euratom. 96 In 1965 a unified executive
was established in the Merger Treaty' 97 for all three communi-
ties. After implementation of the Merger Treaty in July 1967,
the three communities began operating under a unified commis-
sion and council of ministers. 9 8 The official title of the Merger
Treaty uses the term European Communities, which came to be
used to refer to the three communities. 199 Even though the
Council and Commission of the three communities merged in
1967, the communities continued to exist separately. The ac-
tions of each of the communities is governed by its respective
treaty.200
G. The Single European Act - 1986
During the 1970s and early 1980s the European Communi-
ties still had not achieved the power many had sought. It was
often considered a hindrance by its Member States. At the
same time Europe's power in the international system was de-
clining. The oil crisis of the 1970s and severe unemployment
slowed economic growth rates. Europe fell behind the United
States and Japan. As a consequence of the relations between
the superpowers, some observers called Europe the chessboard
over which the American and Soviet masters made their strate-
gic moves.
194 ECSC TREATY, supra note 10.
195 EEC TREATY, supra note 3.
196 EURATOM, supra note 11.
197 Merger Treaty, supra note 3.
198 Id.
199 The term European Union came into use in 1993 with the Maastricht
Treaty, which is officially called the Treaty on European Unity. Maastricht
Treaty, supra note 1.
200 HENRY J. STEINR ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 1100 (4th ed.
1994).
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In 1985, Jacques Delors, the French Minister of Finance,
became President of the European Commission 20 1 and proposed
significant and widespread changes. He recommended institu-
tional reform, a common defense, monetary union and a single
market. In February 1986, the Member States agreed to amend
the Treaty of Rome 202 with the Single European Act (SEA),203
which became effective July 1, 1987. That Act set in motion the
formation of an economic union of EU Member States on De-
cember 31, 1992. The unification accomplished by the SEA re-
sulted in over 370 million consumers 20 4 being able to trade
freely without different technical and regulatory standards, bor-
der controls, and excise taxes. As a result, Mr. Delors' plan for a
single market became a reality.
H. The Effect of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992
On November 1, 1993, the Maastricht Treaty on European
Union 20 5 became effective, signaling the birth of the newly
named European Union. It was signed in Maastricht, the
Netherlands on February 7, 1992. The Treaty provided for po-
tentially significant changes in the way Europe does business20 6
and provided for a move to a single European currency.20 7 The
Treaty aimed at monetary cooperation by setting criteria for a
single EU currency. It also increased the powers of the Euro-
pean Parliament in a number of areas, including the right of co-
decision on legislation with the Council of Ministers. 208
201 Mr. Delors was replaced with Jacques Santer of Luxembourg, the current
President of the European Commission. European Union, supra note 43, at 4-5, 12.
202 EEC TREATY, supra note 3.
203 Single European Act, supra note 3.
204 See population figures, supra note 6.
205 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 1.
206 The rest of the world must deal with the EU as the representative of a
united Europe in economic and even political matters. See, e.g., EU Is Rattling Its
Sabers Over U.S. Anti-Cuba Law, WALL ST. J., July 16, 1996, at A8 (EU is ob-
jecting to U.S. law targeting foreign companies doing business in Cuba).
207 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 1, tit. I, art. B. See Maastricht Signals the
Birth of the European Union, EuR., Dec.-Jan. 1993-94, following 24.
208 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 1.
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IV. EARLY EXPOSURE TO A FEDERALIST FORM OF GOVERNMENT
AFFECTS GERMANY'S ATTITUDE TOWARD A UNITED EUROPE
The case of Germany is possibly the most encouraging for
proponents of stronger European integration. A core member of
the EU, and its most populous, with its powerful economy, it
has learned to live with its nine international borders. 20 9 For
many reasons, the German government has been outspoken in
its commitment to ever closer political union within the EU. In
the post-war era, membership in the EU served to overcome the
burdens of the Nazi past.210 It helped to establish a clear west-
ern orientation and a means for reconciliation with its western
neighbors, particularly France, whose territory Germany had
invaded three times in less than one hundred years.21'
Germany relies heavily on foreign trade.21 2 Its economic
well-being and social stability largely depend on its extensive
trade21 3 with EU Member States. 21 4 Economic success under
the umbrella of the EU's free trade provisions, and the rhetoric
of the political leadership of all parties, have ingrained in the
German public a level of acceptance of European sovereignty
unmatched in any other European country. The government of
Helmut Kohl assumed a leadership role in the unification of Eu-
rope. 215 The most compelling factor that explains the seemingly
unshakable German support for European political integration
is, however, Germany's long and overwhelmingly positive expe-
rience with its own federal structure.
209 Countries on which Germany borders are The Netherlands, Belgium, Lux-
embourg, Switzerland, Austria, Czech Republic, Poland, Denmark, and France.
See THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, Volume 5 at 217 (15th Edition 1997);
WILLIAM SPENCER, GERMANY THEN AND Now 23 (1994).
210 Chancellor Kohl has staked his political career on this issue, even in the
face of enormous domestic difficulties. See Alan Cowell, Kohl Finds Pet Project for
European Currency May Prove his Undoing, N.Y. TIMES, June, 12, 1997, at A12.
211 1870, 1914, and 1940. See also Noel Malcolm, The Case Against Europe,
FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 52, 54 (1995).
212 FACTS ABouT GERMANY 216-17 (Arno Kappler ed., 1995).
213 In 1994, Germany's exports totaled $437 billion with 48% of those exports
going to other EU Member States. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1997
767 (1996).
214 Ludger Ktilanhardt, Germany's Role in European Security, SAIS REVIEW
XV, Fall 1995, at 110.
215 SPENCER, supra note 209, at 138.
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German federal tradition is extensive and readily apparent
even to the casual observer.216 Life does not revolve around a
single metropolitan area as it does in France and Britain. 217
There is no dominant political center, and it is not unusual to
see a provincial Minister-President become Federal Chancellor,
a career move inconceivable in most of Germany's neighboring
countries. 2 18
A. History
When Germany united in 1871, the Bismarckian constitu-
tion provided a federal framework which was viewed as an ap-
propriate successor to the particularism that had characterized
the German-speaking territories for centuries, both through the
loosely organized Holy Roman Empire dissolved by Napoleon in
1806 and the North German Confederation of 1867.219 The di-
versity of its people, and their different cultural and linguistic
heritage, were best served in a national community with limited
centralist powers.220 Unification in late nineteenth century
came about under much the same circumstances that propel to-
day's European countries toward integration. 221 Unification oc-
curred, not in answer to a ground swell of popular demand, but
under the leadership of a political elite recognizing pressures of
international market forces, the need to increase competitive-
ness and productivity through standardization, and large scale
investments exceeding the means of the individual states.222
When the German Empire was followed by the Weimar Re-
public in 1919, the states retained a substantial degree of au-
tonomy.223 Later, the twelve years of National Socialism (1933-
216 Nevil Johnson, Territory and Power: Some Historical Determinants of the
Constitutional Structure of the Federal Republic of Germany, in GERMAN FEDERAL-
ISM TODAY 8-22 (Charles Jeffrey & Peter Savigear eds., 1991).
217 Id.
218 See generally Johnson, supra note 216.
219 Id. at 11.
220 Id. at 19.
221 THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS OF 1997 566 (1996).
222 Under the constitution of 1871, twenty-five politically diverse states
(Ldnder) were unified. See Johnson, supra note 231, at 10. These states included
authoritarian monarchies such as Prussia and Bavaria, ecclesiastical states, and
also the Free Imperial City of Bremen, the second oldest republic on record in Eu-
rope. Id.
223 See WEIMAR REICHSFERFASSUNG (Weimar Constitution).
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1945) and the post-war communist German Democratic Repub-
lic (1949-1990) in the eastern part (Soviet zone of occupation)
represented a profound break with the German federal tradi-
tion.224 In the three western zones of occupation, a new federal
state was created in 1949 which again linked up with the Ger-
man pattern of federalism and also met with the approval of the
Western Allies who believed that a decentralized political struc-
ture would serve as a safeguard against totalitarian politics. 225
B. Modern German Federalism
After collapse of communism in eastern Europe, the federal
nature of West Germany's constitutional structure showed it-
self versatile enough to incorporate the newly constituted five
east German states or Ldnder through West Germany's consti-
tution 226 (the Basic Law227). In 1949, the Basic Law had been
specifically designed as a legal vehicle for reunification. 228 Sig-
nificantly, the German Constitution 229 was redrawn in 1992 to
regulate transfer of German sovereignty to the EU.
230
The institutional characteristics of federalism in Germany
have much in common with federations such as the United
States, Switzerland, Canada and Australia,231 but have certain
differentiating factors. 232 Articles 70-82 of the Basic Law pro-
vide for a division of legislative competence between the central
government (Bund) and the states (Lander).233 The Linder are
empowered to execute their own laws and also most of the fed-
eral laws. 234 This type of horizontal and functional federalism,
which involves extensive allocation of legislative authority in
224 THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS OF 1997 767, 768 (1996).
225 Johnson, supra note 216, at 17.
226 GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution], art. 23.
227 When in 1948 the Parliamentary Council was charged with the drafting of
a constitution, it was called "Basic Law" to indicate its transitional nature and to
avoid signaling acceptance of the permanence of Germany's division.
228 See Preamble to the GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution].
229 GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution], art. 23.
230 Eckart Busch, Der neue Artikel 23 soll Bund und Lander nach Europa
fiihren, DAs PARNL EvNNT (36), Aug. 28, 1992, at 19 (German spelling).
231 Ronald L. Watts, West German Federalism: Comparative Perspectives, in
GERMAN FEDERALISM TODAY 23-39 (Charles Jeffrey & Peter Savigear eds., 1991).
232 Id. at 23.
233 GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution], art. 70-82.
234 GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution], art. 83-86.
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central government, with an extensive administrative decen-
tralization, contrasts with the vertical federal principles of the
United States where a duality of jurisdictions acts directly on
persons and property.23 5 In Germany, the chamber represent-
ing the governments of the states, the Bundesrat (in contrast
with the directly elected U.S. Senate), plays a key role in na-
tional policies through its veto right in various legislative areas
and through the Ldnder's executive powers. 236 Bund and
Ldnder are tied to a system of federalism by negotiation that is
characterized by a multi-faceted network 237 resulting in accom-
modation and compromise.238 The Federal Chancellor and the
heads of government of the Lander confer regularly every two
months, while meetings between the U.S. President and the
governors take place much less frequently. Furthermore, the
Chancellor's staff and corresponding colleagues in the Ldnder
(chiefs of Senatskanzleien) prepare and coordinate these impor-
tant meetings. 239
There can be no doubt that federalism in Germany has un-
dergone drastic changes over the past few decades. 240 The de-
mands on the social market economy and welfare state have
greatly increased and federal expenditures have invaded even
areas of responsibility formerly reserved entirely for the Lander
(e.g. higher education).241 Through an Equalization Law
(Finanzausgleichgesetz) the federal government is obliged to re-
distribute taxes. 242 The law assures that no Land ends up with
a net tax revenue more than five per cent above or below the
federal average, thereby guaranteeing economic and social
cohesion. 243
235 Johnson, supra note 216, at 9.
236 Watts, supra note 231, at 31.
237 Uwe Leonardy, The Working Relationships Between Bund And Linder In
The Federal Republic Of Germany, in GERMAN FEDERALISM TODAY 40-62 (Charles
Jeffrey & Peter Savigear eds., 1991).
238 M. Donald Hancock, in THE POLITICS OF DEMOCRATIC CORPORATISM 48 et
seq. (1989).
239 Id. at 44.
240 Id..
241 Ulrich Karpen, Federalism, in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUB-
LIC OF GERMANY 205-21 (Ulrich Karpen & Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft eds., 1988).
242 FINANZAUSGLEICHGESETZT (Federal Equalization of Burdens Law). See also
Watts, supra note 252, at 26.
243 JOHN ARDAGH, GERMANY AND THE GERMANS 86 et seq. (1991).
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C. Constitutional Acceptance Of The EU
Germany appears to have fared well with its cooperative
and flexible mode of operation which is demonstrated by the
newly revised Articles 23 and 24 of the Basic Law:
(1) With a view to establishing a united Europe the Federal Re-
public of Germany shall participate in the development of the Eu-
ropean Union, which is committed to democratic, rule-of-law,
social and federal principles as well as the principle of subsidiary,
and ensures protection of basic rights comparable in substance to
that afforded by this Basic Law. To this end the Federation may
transfer sovereign powers by law with the consent of the
Bundesrat .... 244
The constitution expressly secures the rights of the Ldnder in
this process: "The Bundestag and, through the Bundesrat, the
Ldnder shall be involved in matters concerning the European
Union. The Federal Government shall inform the Bundestag
and the Bundesrat comprehensively and as quickly as possi-
ble."245 In certain designated areas the EU has a range of legis-
lative powers binding on its Member States (agriculture, trade,
competition, transport), which according to the constitutional
distribution of power in Germany, are incumbent upon the
Ldnder.246 EU directives on cultural, educational, broadcast-
ing, environmental issues and on health policy are essentially
infringing on Ldnder legislative powers.247 Thus, the constitu-
tion further stipulates that "[tihe Bundesrat shall be involved in
the decision-making process of the Federation in so far as it
would have to be involved in a corresponding internal measure
or in so far as the Ldnder would be internally responsible."248
Besides the means of Ldnder participation through the
Bundesrat, the Ldnder have succeeded in establishing direct
political contacts with EU institutions through Land Informa-
tion Offices in Brussels and Missions of the Ldnder in Bonn.
244 BASIc LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (official trans., Press
and Information Office of the German Federal Republic 1994) (1994).
245 GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution], art. 23(2).
246 Rudolf Hrbek, German Federalism and the Challenge of European Integra-
tion, in GERMAN FEDERALISM TODAY 84-102 (Charles Jeffrey & Peter Savigear eds.,
1991).
247 Id. at 86.
248 GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution], art. 23 (4).
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Specialists in European affairs have been added to Land gov-
ernments as EU policy coordinators and advisors. Thus, the
German Lander have met the European challenge in two ways;
through intensified, direct activities and through new statutory
guarantees for their rights of participation in decision-making
on EU matters. 249
D. The Effect of the EU
Europe has seen significant political changes in the last few
years and no other European country has been altered more
than Germany. With the fall of the Iron Curtain, Germany has
moved overnight from being on the periphery of western Europe
to the heart of continental Europe.250 Preoccupation with do-
mestic political and economic issues have started to influence
public opinion on the country's European agenda, most notably
showing reservation in recent polls about EMU25 1 and the re-
luctance of giving up the Deutsche Mark (DM).25 2 Unemploy-
ment and a slowdown of the economy have created second
thoughts in the minds of many Germans about the price of EU
membership. 25 3 The EU already costs the average German
twice as much as a Dutch citizen and four times as much as a U.
K citizen.25 4 Many people question the message of "Europe's
Architect," Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who has made the widen-
ing and deepening of the EU a matter of war or peace. 25 5 There
is an issue as to whether his forceful politicking is divisive. 256
249 Hrbek, supra note 267.
250 Nobert Walter, Evolving German Economy: Unification, the Social Market,
European and Global Integration, SAis REVIEW Fall 1995, Vol. XV, Special Issue,
55-82 (55).
251 Eighty-four per cent of Germans want EMU postponed. EMU: What the
Markets Tell You, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 3, 1996, at 39, 39. See also Europeans See
March to New Currency Hit New Stumbling Blocks, WALL ST. J., June 2, 1997, at
Al.
252 Hans-Peter Schwartz, United Germany and European Integration, SAIs RE-
VIEW, Fall 1995, Vol. XV, Special Issue, 83-102 (100).
253 Patricia Clough & Kristy Lang, Self-interest Now the Common Currency,
THE SUNDAY TIMES, Oct. 1, 1995, at 5.
254 European Union Single-currency-minded, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 23,1995, at
61-62.
255 lain McWhirter, Sound of the Europhile is just a distant ecu, THE OB-
SERVER, Dec. 10, 1995, at 3.
256 Cowell, supra note 210, at A12.
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The growing federal influence threatens to upset the bal-
ance between Bund and Lander. New challenges will test the
strength of the Ldnder, not the least of which is Germany's
membership in the EU which affects the rights of the Ldnder
profoundly. Yet, the tension between centripetal and centrifugal
forces is a given in any federal system.
V. COMPARISON OF THE EARLY U.S. EVOLUTION FROM
INDEPENDENT STATES TO A FEDERALIST FORM OF GOVERNMENT
There are some parallels between the recent evolving sta-
tus of federalism in the European Union in the 1940s 257 and the
development of the federal form of government in the U.S. be-
tween 1774 and 1787.258 These parallels may give insight into
a possible progression toward integration and federalism by the
nations of Europe. This comparison cannot be exact, but corre-
sponding events in the early days of the establishment of a
union of states in America may give an indication of the general
direction in which the EU could eventually be propelled.
Any comparison does not really begin until the Second Con-
tinental Congress convened in 1775 driven by the necessities of
a pending war with Great Britain.25 9 The Second Continental
Congress adopted the Declaration of Independence in 1776 and
went on to make the first efforts to establish an institutional
base by organizing an army and officially declaring war on
Great Britain.260 The efforts toward developing governmental
structures grew out of a need for unity of the newly formed
states261 and provided, for the first time, an American institu-
tional focus such as occurred in 1952 with the formation in Eu-
rope of the ECSC. 262  It is here that an important
differentiating factor arises between the U.S. and EU histories
because working with colonized units newly formed into states
is easily distinguishable from a situation involving the EU's nu-
merous well established national identities.
257 URwIN, supra note 7, at 8.
258 See generally Scudiere, supra note 24.
259 Scudiere, supra note 24, at 3.
260 Id. at 4.
261 See id.
262 LEONARD, supra note 72, at 5-6.
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The Second Continental Congress was hampered in its abil-
ity to act because it was a group without legal authority except
when it acted with the consent of the states.263 It was replaced
with the Congress of Confederation in 1781 when the states
that made up the original thirteen American colonies signed the
Articles of Confederation. 264 Just as the sovereign nations of
Europe are loath to give up their sovereignty to Brussels, the
states were cautious about creating a powerful central
government. 265
The framers tried to prevent this by wording the document
in such a way that the Articles guaranteed each state's sover-
eignty and independence. 266 Each state had one vote in Con-
gress regardless of its size and population. 267 Congress could
not levy taxes, regulate trade or interfere with the states or
their citizens. 268 There was no executive branch nor system of
national courts so the institutional structure was insufficient to
sustain a strong nation at that point.269
In a clear departure from the current state of affairs in the
EU, and resulting directly from the crisis in the newly forming
nation at that time, the central government was granted the
power to declare war, manage foreign relations, establish an
army and navy, issue and borrow money and control Indian af-
fairs.270 Some national leaders later became dissatisfied with
the Articles but were stymied in their efforts to change the doc-
ument because amendments required the unanimous vote of all
thirteen states.271 Thus, the same issue arose with regard to
the U.S. Articles of Confederation as now exists in the EU on
the question of retaining the existing veto practice or changing
to a majority vote.272
263 Scudiere, supra note 24, at 4-5.
264 The Articles of Confederation were in the process of being signed while the
First Continental Congress was functioning from 1777 through March 1, 1781, af-
ter the Second Continental Congress was formed. Id. at 4.
265 Scudiere, supra note 24, at 5.
266 See id.
267 See id. at 4.
268 See id. at 5.
269 See id.
270 Scudiere, supra note 24.
271 Id. at 7-8.
272 See LASOK & BRIDGE, supra note 58, at 240.
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After the states won independence in the Revolutionary
War which ended in 1783, they faced the problems of peacetime
government which is approximately the stage in which the EU
finds itself after the ending of the Cold War. The Articles of
Confederation were abandoned in 1787.273 The Constitution
was written as the new plan of government and established not
merely an assembly of representatives of thirteen independent
states, but a national government that exercised its authority
over all citizens. 274 Establishing the authority of the central
government had been difficult, as demonstrated in 1819 in the
controversy that led to the decision in McCulloch v. Maryland,
in which Chief Justice Marshall used the Constitution's
Supremacy Clause to find in favor of the federal government. 275
The EU has been working on its organization of Member
States for more than forty years culminating in the Maastricht
Treaty.276 The debate in Europe still continues between the in-
tegrationists and the nationalists. In the U.S. questions raised
about the extent of power exercised by the central government
have continued throughout the years. In 1828, John Calhoun
stated that the Constitution was a compact formed by "sover-
eign and independent communities," an indication that he was
an advocate of states' rights who remained unimpressed with
power vested in a federal form of government.2 7 7 Controversies
based on states' rights versus federal power had to be resolved
in the Civil War starting in 1861 when the southern states se-
ceded from the Union because of their objections to the federal
273 Scudiere, supra note 24, at 5.
274 The Constitution was ratified between the years 1787 and 1790. Id. at 13.
275 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1824). In this case the Maryland legislature levied
a tax on the Bank of the United States which had been chartered by the federal
government Id. The cashier of the bank refused to pay the tax and was convicted
of violating the law by the state courts. Id. Chief Justice Marshall used the reason-
ing of the supremacy clause to reach the conclusion in favor of the federal govern-
ment that, "the constitutional laws enacted by Congress" supersede all
incompatible state regulations. See C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTION, 71 (1968).
276 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 1.
277 PRITcHEr, supra note 275, at 62.
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rules on slavery and tariffs,2 78 and erupted again with the civil
rights movement starting in the 1950s.2 7 9
The issue of the amount of power vested in the central gov-
ernment is not easily settled either during the development of a
federal form of government nor after its adoption.280 In the
U.S. there is still evidence of anti-federalist sentiments in the
proliferation of militia-type organizations who continue to ob-
ject to the authority of central government. Perhaps some an-
swers for the EU can be found in the history of the U.S. and, if
nothing else, there is comfort in the fact that the U.S. encoun-
tered, and continues to encounter, many of the same kinds of
problems.
VI. CONCLUSION
No structure similar to the EU exists. It is a structure that
resulted from a desire on the part of sovereign European na-
tions to avoid repeating more than a millennium of conflict. The
EU has evolved from an association formed for reasons of polit-
ical expediency and protection into a supranational entity in-
volved with far-reaching economic, political, and social issues.
A major obstacle to the growth of a federal EU is the extent
to which independent nations are willing to relinquish their
sovereignty. The advance toward unification in subsequent
years is not easy. Many citizens in the Member States are "re-
luctant Europeans," with the rise and fall of interest in the EU
affected by the political persuasion of national leaders or the
state of the economy. 28 '
278 ISAAC KRAMNICK, The Discourse of Politics in 1787: The Constitution and
its critics on Individualism, Community, and the State, in To FORM A MORE PER-
FECT UNION: THE CRITICAL IDEAS OF THE CONSTITUTION, 102 (1992).
279 PRITCHETr, supra note 275, at 81.
280 No Member State of the EU has attempted to revoke its status as an EU
Member State, so it is unclear what steps the EU would take to prevent departure
from the EU. See URWIN, supra note 7, at 254. Some indication of how the EU may
react may be found by examining events surrounding Greenland's departure from
the EU in 1985. Greenland was a colony of Denmark at the time of Denmark's
entry into the EU in 1973. As a result, Greenland became part of the EU as it was
part of Denmark. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Denmark gave Greenland
home rule over certain matters. As a result, Greenland opted to leave the EU.
Through a series of negotiations lasting about three years, the EU permitted
Greenland to leave the EU. Id.
281 As an example, France under former President Frangois Mitterand was a
key promoter of the integration of Europe. See Alan Riding, Europe Again Divides
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Outside factors, beginning in World War II, caused the first
inroads toward foregoing the usual nationalistic tendencies of
Europeans and to cause them to protect themselves through the
creation of an institutional framework .282 Europe must be pre-
pared to meet the type of internal crisis that arose in Bosnia
since NATO and the United Nations are largely ineffective in
solving problems of civil warfare within the boundaries of Eu-
rope.283 The new global marketplace has created the impetus
for setting aside nationalistic considerations because their eco-
nomic position is only enhanced by joining together in an inte-
grated entity.
In post-Cold War Europe, the greatest task is the need to
compete effectively against the United States, Japan and the
growing Asian economies. Europeans are propelled toward inte-
gration because without it they cannot successfully compete on
a global scale. Economic decline surely would put the social and
ultimately the political peace at risk within the EU member
states.
There are already alarming signs of erosion of the social
solidarity which is held as a key element of contemporary
Europeans. Politicians know that present governments will be
judged by the electorate on their capacity to create jobs. The
ongoing inter-governmental conference (IGC) seems to be the
backdrop for a process of scaling back the grand vision of a fed-
eral Europe that, above all, Helmut Kohl had promoted until
now.284 Jacques Chirac's current formulation of an original
construction based neither on a federal model, nor limited to a
simple free-trade zone,285 has become, at present, the operative
French, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 5, 1994, at 2; William Drozdiak, President Chirac
Names Juppd as Prime Minister, INT'L HERALD TRiB., May 18, 1995, at 1. Mr. Mit-
terand helped design the Maastricht Treaty and set the stage for turning the
twelve-nation bloc into a federation. Id. Now, with the leadership of President
Jacques Chirac, who was elected in the Spring of 1995, the French position is
changing because Mr. Chirac comes with a reputation for favoring a looser Union
and is not committed to the federal vision as are others such as Chancellor Helmut
Kohl of Germany. Id.
282 LEONARD, supra note 72, at 3-7.
283 Europe is seeking to expand its role in NATO by embarking on military
missions without full U.S participation. Europe to Widen Its Role in NATO, L.A.
TIMES, June 4, 1996, at Al.
284 Iain McWhirter, Sound of the Europhile is just a distant ecu, THE OB-
SERVER, Dec. 10, 1995, at 3.
285 The Helmut-and-Jacques Show, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 6, 1996, at 49.
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vision for the future organization of the EU. The IGCs, since the
1980s, have become important vehicles for pushing European
integration further ahead 28 6 and it is therefore to be taken as
an encouraging signal that the entire year of 1996 is scheduled
for IGC negotiations.
The burden is placed squarely on the Europeans. The EU,
in a stronger centralized governmental form, is a solution. It is
important to the welfare of all of Europe to have a strong insti-
tutional structure with the necessary political and military
units. The basic judicial system already exists, as well as the
skeleton for an executive and legislative arm of government.
Uniting under a federal system of government is the key to sur-
vival in the global marketplace and in the new world order that
has developed after the removal of the Soviet threat. The final
direction will rest on whether these outside influences will force
the majority of Europeans to feel that they are given little
choice except to fully integrate to survive.
286 Juliet Lodge, Towards a political union? in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE FUTURE 377-85 (Juliet Lodge ed., 2d ed. 1993).
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